On Donald Hoffmans case against reality

To many, Donals Hoffmans ideas about reality are considered radical. To me they seem obvious and, not to sound arrogant but, rather mundane. However, there is one point where it gets very interesting, and which to me, he seem event to miss him self. And where actually I think I got some new enlightenment.
Sam and Donald talks about the relation between perceived reality (PR) and full reality (R) and Sam proposes that there must be some isomorphism between PR and R. Donald pointed out that the relation is surely complex; but what he did not say explicitly, but which make things interesting, is that there is no reason actually to expect this to be an isomorphism at all. It could rather be a projection. And if that is the case, it might well be that there is no way to recover R from that projection/PR. It seem there can be multiple things that can be the case here; it could possibly be that it is possible to recover R from PR due to that it happens that R only has one way to be, given the structure of PR space.
But it could also be that the projected structure (which is probably a better word than space) is compatible with an infinite number of different complete/full realities.
I guess it could also be something like an ill-conditioned problem, that the projected structure in principle is completely connect to the full reality, but some parts/links in that projection are so weak that it is essentially impossible to probe them.
I hate when people who don't know a squat about things like Quantum Mechanics talk about it and throw out uninformed thoughts. But I will still do it here, and perhaps I am at least not completely uninformed. The thought is that perhaps the wavefunction collapse is a consequence of this ill-condition and that is why it is so hard to probe past it.
Given the non-existing of very weak link between PR and R, perhaps the evolutionary pressure on us is only from PR and there might be other PRs with completely other evolutionary pressure.

On perception

In a recent blog post I discussed the topology of colors. As a generalisation, I would here like to discuss a fundamental property of perception in general.

The perceptions that a being have are in some sense irreducible. That is, they can not be described in terms of any other quantity  (this is kind of related to Wittgensteins idea of atomic concepts. It might be the perceptions that are those concepts). The reason for that they cannot is that those perceptions are part of the consciousness. They form the representation in the consciousness of the sensory input. Hence, if they were reducible, they would have to be interpreted in terms of something else by the consciousness and thus not be part of the consciousness but only something interpreted.

Topology of colors

These ideas have been updated and clarified somewhat and put into a pdf instead.