Inlägg
But it also relaxes the requirements on drawing capabilities:
måndag 10 augusti 2015
Being an artist with focus on topology...
... really limits your audience.
But it also relaxes the requirements on drawing capabilities:
But it also relaxes the requirements on drawing capabilities:
onsdag 8 juli 2015
Could getting rid of sim-cards be a part of 5G?
SIM-cards are really outdated! People have been asking for years when they will be abounded. But it is not easy to replace such an integral part of the mobile systems. So, maybe do the right thing put as an item for our 5g systems to replace the sim-cards with something better?
söndag 14 juni 2015
About the structure of the transcend
Assume the human race has become what it is using evolution. Then that process should have optimized us as beings for the scenarios we encounter in our everyday lives. If we can conceive other processes, one can be inclined to believe that it is only a lucky coincidence that the structure of those processes is similar enough for us to grasp.
Thus, if we can assume that there is something that has a structure that has no resemblance what so ever with our reality. This will constitute the transcend and we will have no way to describe or understand that structure.
However, for this to have no resemblance with our reality, there can be no point of contact with our reality either. If there is, this point will have to have structure that is "compatible" with the reality we know of. And hence can be described.
With this kind of reasoning, if there is such a thing as the transcend, it is of no interest for us, since it does not interact with our reality at all.
This reasoning does not rule out that there are things in our reality that we can not understand, but it tell that if there is structure of the kind described above, it is of no interest for us. Hence, arguing that an entity such as god belongs to the transcend is only to argue that god is of no interest to us. Further, if it is claimed that god interact, or has done so in the past, with our reality, the god structure falls within the category of reality above.
Thus, if we can assume that there is something that has a structure that has no resemblance what so ever with our reality. This will constitute the transcend and we will have no way to describe or understand that structure.
However, for this to have no resemblance with our reality, there can be no point of contact with our reality either. If there is, this point will have to have structure that is "compatible" with the reality we know of. And hence can be described.
With this kind of reasoning, if there is such a thing as the transcend, it is of no interest for us, since it does not interact with our reality at all.
This reasoning does not rule out that there are things in our reality that we can not understand, but it tell that if there is structure of the kind described above, it is of no interest for us. Hence, arguing that an entity such as god belongs to the transcend is only to argue that god is of no interest to us. Further, if it is claimed that god interact, or has done so in the past, with our reality, the god structure falls within the category of reality above.
torsdag 14 maj 2015
On the limits of our knowledge, again.
By the way, I have to write another on. The talk I just discussed on limits of science. I have another interesting idea about the limits. There seems we are trapped within the big and the small. At large scales we are ultimately captured by the speed of light. On the small scale we are ultimately captured by quantum resolution. Now this to me looks like some tough limits on what we can know. Does it also indicate that someone trapped us...?
On scientific knowledge
I was watching this very interesting debate between some great thinkers of our time. And of course I was thinking: "no, that have to be wrong"!
The question at hand is: is all knowledge empirical? Kruass is strongly advocating thing line. Dennet and Pigliucci is a bit more vague, but at the end seem to lean to the same conclusion. I would claim that this is wrong. There is knowledge (if we even can define the term!) that is not empirical. My example of this is basically mathematical knowledge. Krauss is claiming also mathematical knowledge is empirical since the basis (the axioms) is empirical to their nature is not correct. There can be many axioms not at all connected to any empirical facts - in fact ZF is an excellent example of this. Even the designers of the damn thing did not like it since it was counter intuitive with all these axioms. Nevertheless we would all agree that "the integral of 1/x is ln(x)" is knowledge. Or an even better example, the properties of the monster group constitute knowledge.
I think I would rather go further actually and say that all knowledge is of non-empirical nature. Empirical stuff is what can be observed. However observations can never be trusted. Never. However, deductions (which might be based on observations) can be trusted and render knowledge. But all that knowledge is of the for "if a the b". If a is observed, that b can be deduced. Thus, the knowledge does not depend on the empirical fact, but is only claims something about logical consequences given the empirical fact.
The question at hand is: is all knowledge empirical? Kruass is strongly advocating thing line. Dennet and Pigliucci is a bit more vague, but at the end seem to lean to the same conclusion. I would claim that this is wrong. There is knowledge (if we even can define the term!) that is not empirical. My example of this is basically mathematical knowledge. Krauss is claiming also mathematical knowledge is empirical since the basis (the axioms) is empirical to their nature is not correct. There can be many axioms not at all connected to any empirical facts - in fact ZF is an excellent example of this. Even the designers of the damn thing did not like it since it was counter intuitive with all these axioms. Nevertheless we would all agree that "the integral of 1/x is ln(x)" is knowledge. Or an even better example, the properties of the monster group constitute knowledge.
I think I would rather go further actually and say that all knowledge is of non-empirical nature. Empirical stuff is what can be observed. However observations can never be trusted. Never. However, deductions (which might be based on observations) can be trusted and render knowledge. But all that knowledge is of the for "if a the b". If a is observed, that b can be deduced. Thus, the knowledge does not depend on the empirical fact, but is only claims something about logical consequences given the empirical fact.
måndag 11 maj 2015
On free will
There is an exciting talk by Daniel Dennet about free will. His take is a very interesting one, being a compatibilist. But I would like to take another stab at this case. Not that I know much of it, I must admit. But of course it is one of the tricky ones. So, my take, here goes.
I think one should be able to give a more detailed account for what free will is than with guys like Daniel Dennet is doing. The problem is that there is a quite large gap between discussing determinism and free will. Determinism can be described like
F = m a
or is many other ways ans mathematically well formed laws. This is not a consequence of determinism. It is determinism, and it is how we can understand it.
At the other end of the spectrum, there is randomness. This is just as nice as determinism. It can be described using pure mathematics. We can say that the random variable X obeys the distribution A(P1, P2, ..., Pn), where the P's are parameters.
Now, the problem is that non of these descriptions fit free will, and at the same time it seem free will is something similar to these concepts. Could it be that one can define free will as: An entity has free will if, via communication, it can be made to obey either a deterministic law or any stochastic. Thus, my definition require that the entity can communicate some way.
Anyway, back to work. Let's elaborate more on this later.
I think one should be able to give a more detailed account for what free will is than with guys like Daniel Dennet is doing. The problem is that there is a quite large gap between discussing determinism and free will. Determinism can be described like
F = m a
or is many other ways ans mathematically well formed laws. This is not a consequence of determinism. It is determinism, and it is how we can understand it.
At the other end of the spectrum, there is randomness. This is just as nice as determinism. It can be described using pure mathematics. We can say that the random variable X obeys the distribution A(P1, P2, ..., Pn), where the P's are parameters.
Now, the problem is that non of these descriptions fit free will, and at the same time it seem free will is something similar to these concepts. Could it be that one can define free will as: An entity has free will if, via communication, it can be made to obey either a deterministic law or any stochastic. Thus, my definition require that the entity can communicate some way.
Anyway, back to work. Let's elaborate more on this later.
torsdag 7 maj 2015
On " the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences"
There is allot of fuzz on this question out there. E.g. on fqxi. To me this is not so strange. If we assume nature has structure, and is not only chaos, then why would not any attempt to capture that structure succed?
The point is that any modeling structure that you can come up with will be sufficient to describe (that is, model) at least a part of reality (in approximation). And from there it is just refinement. Science is an optimization process, or a search if you want. An optimization to minimize the error between model and measuremen.
Thus we (the humans) could have started from any mathematics and enevideble would have ended up with a physical model that will capture some part of reality.
Prenumerera på:
Inlägg (Atom)